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Briefing the Second Amendment Before the
Supreme Court
Alan Gura*
Fifteen thousand words could not encompass every last scrap of
support for the individual rights model of the Second Amendment.
Nor could fifteen thousand words suffice to contain the wealth of
material debunking the so-called collective right or public-purpose
theories of the right to keep and bear arms. And no word limit
could adequately absorb the various public policy arguments relating to the private ownership of firearms, none of which, in the end,
are relevant to the legal question of the Second Amendment's
meaning. But on February 4, 2008, fifteen thousand words is
what we had to work with briefing District of Columbia v. Hellerthe case that would, as designed, determine whether the Second
Amendment to the Constitution secures a meaningful individual
right.
More often than not, word limits improve rather than cramp legal writing. Word limits force counsel to cut distracting verbiage
and impose sometimes difficult but necessary choices about which
material to include so as to distill a focused and persuasive argument. Such was the case in Heller, where a brief twice as long
might not have been half as good. And while we welcomed the
truly excellent amicus curiae briefs exploring useful angles beyond
the scope of our effort, the necessarily broader mission of a respondent's brief was still accomplished in the space allotted.
The editors of Duquesne Law Review have asked me to comment
on the Respondent's Brief in Heller and offer insight into the rationale underlying its contents. I'm happy to oblige.

* Lead Counsel for Respondent in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783
(2008). The brief excerpted in this article benefitted greatly from the co-authorship of
Clark Neily and Robert Levy, two of the sharpest minds in the liberty-business. Any shortcoming in the final product is rooted in my stubbornness.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent Dick Anthony Heller successfully challenged the
Nation's three most draconian infringements of Second Amendment rights. D.C. Code section 7-2502.02(a)(4) forbids registration
of handguns, thereby effecting a ban on the possession of handguns within the home. D.C. Code section 7-2507.02 forbids the
possession of any functional firearms within the home, without
exception. D.C. Code section 22-4504(a) forbids the carrying of a
handgun without a license. This section was amended in 1994 to
criminalize the unlicensed carrying of a handgun within one's
home. "It is common knowledge ... that with very rare exceptions
licenses to carry pistols have not been issued in the District of Columbia for many years and are virtually unobtainable." Bsharah
v. United States, 646 A.2d 993, 996 n.12 (D.C. 1994). Respondent
challenges this provision only as it relates to his home.
No state, and only one other major city (Chicago), bans handguns outright. The other two provisions appear unique to Washington, D.C.
[Strategic civil rights litigation depends on crafting a
narrow case, one which forces the courts to answer the
fewest number of questions. Our objective was to have the
Second Amendment defined as securing a meaningful individual right-not resolve the constitutionality of every
possible gun regulation. No other right is defined once and
forever in all its possible manifestations by a single Supreme Court opinion, and there is no logical reason why
the Second Amendment should differ in this respect.
The courts would naturally be aware that a decision in
our favor might have consequences beyond the challenged
provisions, but nonetheless, the more laws challenged, the
greater the risk that the case becomes unglued as the
analysis grows ever-more complex. There is also a practical limit to the scope of any litigation. Saving the Second
Amendment was ambitious enough.
Accordingly, we limited the case to the most farreaching, least-defensible, and absolute prohibitions. We
were well-aware of other serious constitutional flaws in
the D.C. Code, but this was simply not the time and place
to litigate them. A healthy result for the Second Amendment would build the steps for future litigation against
other unconstitutional laws, which could then be given
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more careful consideration by the courts. Indeed, within
months of the Supreme Court's decision, the D.C. City
Council repealed the city's ban on semi-automatic weapons, doubtless realizing that such a blanket ban on most
firearms would not survive the common-use test announced by the Court.]
In reviewing the handgun ban, the D.C. Circuit correctly applied this Court's test for determining which "arms" are constitutionally protected. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
The court found that handguns pass the Miller test, as they are
arms of the type in common use by individuals, the possession of
which can contribute to the common defense. PA53a.
The D.C. Circuit further held, correctly, that as home possession
of handguns is constitutionally protected, Petitioners may not
prohibit their movement within the home. The court struck down
the license provision for carrying handguns as applied to home
possession. PA54a-55a.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit correctly found that the literal text of
section 7-2507.02 "amounts to a complete prohibition on the lawful
use of handguns for self-defense," PA55a, and is thus unconstitutional.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Second Amendment plainly protects "the right of the people"-an individual right--"to keep and bear arms."
[We wrestled with the question of whether to add a claim
alleging the laws violated an unenumerated Ninth
Amendment right to self-defense.
The Supreme Court
would find, as we urged, that the Second Amendment codified the pre-existing right to arms at English law, itself a
corollary to Blackstone's inherent right of self-defense and
self-preservation. But we concluded that an unenumerated right approach would bite off far too much.
The Second Amendment question was complex enough
without venturing into the murky landscape of unenumerated rights. The Ninth Amendment, our preferred textual
source of unenumerated rights, deserves its own focused
revival effort. And the D.C. Circuit had recently rejected
efforts to fashion an unenumerated right to arms, owing to
the Second Amendment's actual enumeration of that very
right. FraternalOrder of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d
898, 905-06 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The wisdom of our decision to
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avoid a separate self-defense right claim was regrettably
verified during Heller's pendency by Abigail Alliance v.
Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), rejecting claims that terminally ill patients had an inherent
self-preservation claim to potentially life-saving treatment.
The result in Abigail Alliance should be reconsidered in
light of Heller's confirmation that there does exist an inherent right of self-defense.]
However else Petitioners might regulate the possession and use
of arms, their complete ban on the home possession of all functional firearms, and their prohibition against home possession and
movement of handguns, are unconstitutional.
The Amendment's structure and etymology are not overly mysterious. The first clause, referencing the importance of "[a] well
regulated Militia," provides a non-exclusive yet perfectly sensible
justification for securing the people's right to keep and bear arms.
In any event, the Second Amendment's preamble cannot limit,
transform, or negate its operative rights-securing text.
The Second Amendment was engendered by the Framers' bitter
experience with the King's disarmament of the population. That
disarmament was especially pernicious to the colonists, who fervently believed they possessed an individual right to arms. In resisting British tyranny, the militia were not directed by the government officials they sought to overthrow, but certainly depended
on the citizenry's familiarity with, and private possession of, firearms.
The Second Amendment's text thus reflects two related, nonexclusive concerns: it confirms the people's right to arms and explains that the right is necessary for free people to guarantee their
security by acting as militia.
[Extremists on either side of the gun issue place undue
emphasis on the Second Amendment's preamble. Gun prohibitionists wrongly believe that the preamble transforms
"the right of the people" into a right to do as one is told
within the confines of a state-sanctioned military organization, notwithstanding any contrary federal authority. But
to the extent I have received hate mail, it is largely from
the lunatic fringe that believes the Second Amendment entitles individual Americans to all manner of modern military equipment. This latter construction not only ignores
the Second Amendment's roots in the right of self-defense,
but also it would narrow the practical use of the right to
arms. If the Second Amendment guaranteed only a right to
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arms with which to resist tyrannical government, almost
any restriction on the right to arms would be constitutional as not immediately impeding resistance to tyrannyincluding a law mandating all guns be stored in a nonfunctional condition with no exception for home selfdefense, and perhaps a law that bars the possession of guns
useful for self-defense but not militarily practical, such as
Heller's .22 revolver.
This is not to suggest that the Second Amendment has no
power-checking aspect-the militia clause confirms that it
does, and the brief argues the point at some length. But
power-checking is a (non-exclusive) reason for securing
the right to arms, not a defining feature or source of the
right.]
The Second Amendment's drafting and ratification history demonstrates it was designed to secure individual rights, consistent
with the demands of the Anti-Federalists, whom the Bill of Rights
was intended to mollify. Petitioners' militia theory was specifically
addressed-and rejected-by the Framers, and that rejection is
confirmed by centuries of precedent. Precedent likewise confirms
the individual nature of Second Amendment rights.
Under this Court's precedent, the arms whose individual possession is protected by the Second Amendment are those arms
that (1) are of the kind in common use, such that civilians would
be expected to have them for ordinary purposes, and (2) would
have military utility in time of need. A weapon that satisfies only
one of these requirements would not be protected by the Second
Amendment. Handguns indisputably satisfy both requirements.
Petitioners concede that a functional firearms ban would be inconsistent with an individual right to arms. The dispute surrounding D.C. Code section 7-2507.02 thus merely concerns statutory
interpretation. The D.C. Circuit's interpretation of this section's
language is correct.
Although this case does not call upon the Court to determine the
standard of review applicable to regulations of Second Amendment rights, Respondent observes that the right to arms protects
two of the most fundamental rights-the defense of one's life inside one's home, and the defense of society against tyrannical
usurpation of authority. Petitioners' casual use of social science
sharply underscores the importance of securing Second Amendment rights with a meaningful standard of review.
[Outcome-determinative standards of review have apparently fallen out of fashion. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539
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U.S. 558 (2003), for example, the Supreme Court announced
a liberty interest in engaging in consensual intimate relationships without announcing any particular standard of
review. Ultimately, more important in this case than any
particular standard of review would be the mere act of
striking down the challenged provisions, demonstrating
that the Second Amendment is enforceable. Presenting the
case as dependent on a standard of review would unduly
complicate matters, risking the outcome if the Court found
it easier to rule in our favor than agree on a rationale for
doing so. But we could not ignore the standard of review
issue entirely, and so, in the alternative, we argued for
strict scrutiny.
This approach to the standard of review issue was vindicated. The Court wisely left the matter for another day,
but agreed with our observation that any standard of review would be robust, consistent with the treatment of
other enumerated rights. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818 n.27.1
Finally, Petitioners' contention that the Second Amendment is
not binding law within the Nation's capital is spurious.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECTS AN
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP ORDINARY FIREARMS,
UNRELATED TO GOVERNMENT MILITARY SERVICE.
A.

Preambles Cannot Negate Operative Text.

By its own terms, the rationale of the Second Amendment's preamble is not exclusive. The operative rights-securing clause is
grammatically and logically independent of the preamble. Skilled
diplomacy, a powerful army, or adherence to the constitution may
sufficiently provide for "the security of a free state," and still the
people would enjoy their right to arms. Most critically, the preamble cannot contradict or render meaningless the operative text.
As Petitioners note, preambles are examined only "[i]f words
happen to still be dubious." Pet. Br. 17 (quotation and citation
omitted). "[B]ut when the words of the enacting clause are clear
and positive, recourse must not be had to the preamble." James
Kent, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 516 (9th ed. 1858).
"The preamble can neither limit nor extend the meaning of a statute which is clear. Similarly, it cannot be used to create doubt or
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uncertainty." Norman Singer, 2A SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.04, at 295 (7th ed. 2007).
The Framers were familiar with these rules of construction. One
influential English precedent held:
I can by no means allow of the notion that the preamble shall
restrain the operation of the enacting clause; and that, because the preamble is too narrow or defective, therefore the
enacting clause, which has general words, shall be restrained
from its full latitude, and from doing that good which the
words would otherwise, and of themselves, import; which
(with some heat) his Lordship said was a ridiculous notion.
Copeman v. Gallant, 1 P. Wins. 314, 320 (Ch. 1716); see also
Edward Wilberforce, STATUTE LAW: THE PRINCIPLES WHICH
GOVERN THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF STATUTES 288-89

(1881).
[G]eneral words in the enacting part, shall never be restrained by any words introducing that part; for it is no rule
in the exposition of statutes to confine the general words of
the enacting part to any particular words either introducing
it, or to any such words even in the preamble itself.
King v. Athos, 8 Mod. Rep. 136, 144 (K.B. 1723); see also Mace v.
Cadell, 1 Cowp. 232, 233 (K.B. 1774) ("if the statute meant to
comprehend nothing more than is contained in the preamble, it
means nothing at all").
[Georgetown Law Professor James Oldham taught my
Contracts class in 1992-93. A fan of ancient and obscure
English law, Prof. Oldham frequently regaled the class
with stories of his favorite English jurist, Lord Mansfield.
Citing Lord Mansfield's decision in Mace as authority before the Supreme Court validated my IL experience.]
Preambles are "properly resorted to, where doubts or ambiguities arise upon the words of the enacting part; for if they are clear
and unambiguous, there seems little room for interpretation, except in cases leading to an obvious absurdity, or to a direct overthrow of the intention expressed in the preamble." 1 Joseph Story,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

326-27 (2d ed. 1851). Accordingly, the Constitution's other preambles are given no weight. "Although that [opening] Preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the
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source of any substantive power ... " Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).
The Copyright and Patent Clause preamble would arguably
possess greater operative force than that of the Second Amendment, as it begins with the infinitive that introduces most powers
of Congress. The power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, viewed with the
same breadth as the power "[t]o regulate Commerce," U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3, could stand alone absent the text that follows. In
contrast, the Second Amendment's preamble merely declares a
concept. Yet "Congress need not 'require that each copyrighted
work be shown to promote the useful arts.' " Schnapper v. Foley,
667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). And this
Court does not question whether copyright and patent laws serve
the preambular purpose of promoting progress, though some laws
might fail such examination. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212
(2003).
That the Second Amendment contained a declaration of purpose
was not unusual for its day. But such declarative language was
never given the transformative effect urged by Petitioners. E.g.,
Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 793, 794-95 (1998). The same Congress that passed
the Second Amendment also reauthorized the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, containing this language: "Religion, morality, and
knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness
of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged." Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52. But nobody
would seriously contend that were religion, morality, or knowledge
one day found unnecessary for good government, schools should no
longer be encouraged in the states of the former Northwest Territory.
Petitioners argue that the preamble should be given controlling
weight because " 'it cannot be presumed that any clause in the
constitution is intended to be without effect.'" Pet. Br. 17 (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803)). But their
citation to Marbury is incomplete-the passage concludes: "unless
the words require it." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174. Because
Petitioners urge an interpretation of the preamble inconsistent
with the plain meaning of the operative text, and considering the
established rules of construction governing preambular language,
the "presumption" urged by Petitioners is rebutted. Notwithstanding Marbury, the Court did not give force to the opening preamble
in Jacobson or to the Copyright preamble in Eldred.
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[I was surprised at the city's incomplete citation to Marbury. I was also tempted to cite the Supreme Court's admonition in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941),
to the effect that the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism," but I reconsidered. Why remind the Court that entire
parts of the Bill of Rights can be discarded? The only thing
our opponents would have preferred to wiping out the
Second Amendment's last fourteen words would be to wipe
out the entire Amendment.]
No doubts or ambiguities arise from the words "the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." The words
cannot be rendered meaningless by resort to their preamble. Any
preamble-based interpretive rationale demanding an advanced
degree in linguistics for its explication is especially suspect in this
context. "A bill of rights may be considered, not only as intended to
give law, and assign limits to government . . . , but as giving information to the people [so that] every man of the meanest capacity and understanding may learn his own rights, and know when
they are violated. . . ." 1 St. George Tucker, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, app. 308 (1803).
[The linguistic theories always struck me as reaching.
The Framers didn't have Chomsky, but they did have established canons of statutory construction. To this day,
recognized legal doctrines, not late 20th century Linguistic
Department research, are taught in law schools and relied
upon by legislators, litigators, and judges. The various
theories grounded in the placement of commas or capitalization of certain words in different versions of the Second
Amendment likewise did not merit wasting much space,
sounding as they do much like tax-protestor style claims.
In any event, we have a rich record of what the Framers
and others throughout history have said about the Second
Amendment, none of which references linguistics or
comma placement.]
B.

The Second Amendment's Plain Text Secures an Individual Right.

"The first ten amendments and the original Constitution were
substantially contemporaneous and should be construed in pari
materia." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930), overruled on other grounds, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
There should be no distinction among " 'the people' protected by
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the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments ... ." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (citation omitted).
Conceding that the Second Amendment secures individual
rights, Petitioners nonetheless argue that the term "bear arms" is
exclusively military, such that the Second Amendment right can
be exercised only under the direction of a governmental military
organization. Putting aside this rather strange concept of rightsa "right" to particular weapons in an environment where the individual is obliged to obey orders, or a "right" to defend the government but not oneself or one's family-the text does not support
this notion.
"Keep and bear" embody distinct concepts in the Second
Amendment, just as "speedy and public" reflect separate rights in
the Sixth Amendment. Had the Framers eliminated either
"speedy" or "public" from the Sixth Amendment, they would have
significantly narrowed the right's scope. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII (proscribing "cruel and unusual punishments").
This case concerns the right to "keep" arms in the ordinary
sense of the verb: to possess at home.' "Keep" has no exclusive
military connotation. "Ordinarily courts do not construe words
used in the Constitution so as to give them a meaning more narrow than one which they had in the common parlance of the times
in which the Constitution was written." United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944). When the
Constitution was written, English law had "settled and determined" that "a man may keep a gun for the defence of his house
and family." Mallock v. Eastly, 87 Eng. Rep. 1370, 1374, 7 Mod.
Rep. 482 (C.P. 1744). Legislatures in England and America employed "keep" in the purely individual sense-especially when disarming minorities. See, e.g., 1 W. & M., Sess. 1, c. 15, § 4 (1689)
("no papist . . . shall or may have or keep in his house . . . any
arms .... "); 4 Hening's Statutes at Large (Va.) 131 ("no negro, mulatto, or Indian . . . shall hereafter presume to keep, or carry any
gun, powder, shot, or any club, or other weapon whatsoever....").
Neither did the term "bear arms" have a uniquely military application. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143
(1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Johnson and Webster defined
1. See Question Presented. The "bearing" of arms implicates different interests and
concerns not at issue here.
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"bear" primarily as "to carry." 1 Samuel Johnson, A DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755) (not paginated); Noah Webster,
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(1st ed.

1828) (not paginated) (also "To wear... bear arms in a coat"). Accordingly, "bear arms" often had purely civilian connotations. For
example, Parliament forbade Scottish Highlanders to "use or bear
. . . side-pistols, or guns, or any other warlike weapons, in the
fields, or in the way coming or going to, from or at any church,
market, fair, burials, huntings, meetings, or any occasion whatsoever. . . ." 9 Geo. I Chap. 26 (1724), 15 Statutes at Large 246-47
(1765);2 cf. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857)
(Constitution secured citizens' right "to keep and carry arms
3
wherever they went," along with rights of speech and assembly).
Eighteenth-century constitutional drafters used "bearing arms"
in the individual sense. See PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. XIII ("That
the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves
and the state .... "); VT. CONST. OF 1777, Ch. 1, art. XV (same).
Petitioners' claim that Pennsylvania's drafters used "themselves"
collectively not only defies the word's normal meaning, but would
4
also render it redundant of "the state."
Pennsylvania reiterated "the right of citizens to bear arms, in
defence of themselves and the State" in its 1790 constitution.
James Wilson, delegate to Pennsylvania's 1790 constitutional convention and later Associate Justice of this Court, explained:
W]hen it is necessary for the defence of one's person or house.
• . it is the great natural law of self-preservation, which ...
cannot be repealed, or superseded, or suspended by any human institution [but] is expressly recognized in the constitution of Pennsylvania.
3 WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 84 (Bird

Wilson ed., 1804) (citing PA. CONST. OF 1790, art. IX, sec. XXI); see
2. See Clayton Cramer & Joseph Olson, What Does 'Bear Arms" Imply?, GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POLY (forthcoming 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1021201 (supplying numerous examples.)
3. That early congressional references to "bearing arms" related to military matters
was a function of (1) the issues facing Congress in those years, (2) the perception that Congress did not have broad regulatory powers over private arms, and, of course (3) the Second
Amendment's limitation on those powers. Randy Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms Conditionedon Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEx. L. REV. 237, 260-62 (2004).
4. "Themselves" as otherwise used by the Pennsylvania drafters is self-evidently not
collective: "IT1he people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search or seizure .... PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. X.
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also Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 152, 156 (Pa. 1996). "The
constitutions of most of our States assert that all power is inherent in the people; that . . . it is their right and duty to be at all
times armed. . . ." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice John
Cartwright (June 5, 1824), 16 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
45 (A.A. Lipscomb ed., 1907).
Perhaps the most instructive 18th-century usage of '"ear arms"
is that of James Madison, author of the Second Amendment. In
1785, Madison introduced in Virginia's legislature a hunting bill
drafted by Jefferson. The bill stated, in part:
[I]f, within twelve months after the date of the recognizance
he shall bear a gun out of his inclosed ground, unless whilst
performing military duty, it shall be deemed a breach of the
recognizance, and be good cause to bind him a new, and every
such bearing of a gun shall be a breach of the new recognizance....
A Bill for Preservationof Deer (1785), in 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 443-44 (J. Boyd ed., 1950) (emphases added)..
Madison's usage of "bear" was no personal idiosyncrasy. St.
George Tucker, the leading legal scholar of the early Republic, observed:
The bare circumstance of having arms . . . of itself, creates a
presumption of warlike force in England ....
But ought that
circumstance, of itself, to create any such presumption in
America, where the right to bear arms is recognized and secured in the constitution itself?
5 Tucker, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, app. B at 19 (Con-

cerning Treason).
"An individual could bear arms without being a soldier or militiaman." Leonard Levy, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 135
(1999). But even if "bear arms" had a purely military connotation,
that idiomatic meaning would itself be transformed by inclusion of
the word "keep." For example, "Mary knows how to stir the pot"
conveys a meaning (i.e., cause trouble) very different from, 'Mary
knows how to hold and stir the pot" (i.e., cook).
To the extent the Second Amendment's preamble informs the
nature of the operative rights-securing provision, the necessity of
a "well regulated Militia" does not negate, but rather advances the
individual character of the right to arms.
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The Militia is constitutionally defined as a preexisting entity,
separate and apart from an army or navy that might be raised.
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("... in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia"). "Congress was authorized both to raise and support a
national army and also to organize 'the Militia.' " Perpich v. Dep't
of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 340 (1990). "[T]he militia" are not "troops" or
"standing armies," but "civilians primarily"--"all males physically
capable of acting in concert for the common defense ... " Miller,
307 U.S. at 179.
"Who are the Militia? They consist now of the whole people....
3 Jonathan Elliot, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
425 (2d ed. 1836) (George Mason). That "the 'militia' is identical to
'the people,' " Akhil Amar, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 51 (1998), is evident from Madison's description of "a militia amounting to near
half a million of citizens with arms in their hands," who could resist an oppressive standing army. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, 244
(James Madison) (Carey & McClellan eds., 1990). This militia reflected "the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation," in contrast to
"governments [that] are afraid to trust the people with arms." Id.;
BOSTON EVENING POST, Nov. 21, 1768, at 2, col. 3 ("The total
number of the Militia, in the large province of New-England, is
upwards of 150,000 men, who all have and can use arms. .. .");
NEW YORK PACKET AND AMERICAN ADVERTISER, Apr. 4, 1776, at
2, cols. 1-2 ("Whoever asserts that 10 or 12,000 soldiers would be
sufficient to control the militia of this Continent, consisting of
500,000 brave men, pays but a despicable compliment to the spirit
and ability of Americans").
That "the militia" was broadly composed of the general population, and expected to check government force, belies the notion
that "militia" refers only to specific forces organized by government. The American militia's broad composition set it apart from
its far narrower English counterpart. "[T]he Militia, in this country, is not a Select part of the People, as it is in England, set apart
for that purpose, under Officers... employed and paid at the publick charge; but the Whole body of the people from sixteen years of
age to fifty." Speech of Gov. Morris, June 29, 1744, in 6
DOCUMENTS

RELATING

TO THE

COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW

JERSEY 187 (William Whitehead ed., 1882). "Select militia members in England were required to have qualifications even higher
than those required to be a member of the House of Commons."
David Young, THE FOUNDERS' VIEW OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
11 n.6 (2007) (citation omitted).
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The broad civilian understanding of who constitutes "the Militia" continues today. Congress defines "the militia of the United
States" as comprising all able-bodied males from 17 to 45, who are
or intend to become citizens; and members of the National Guard
up to age 64. 10 U.S.C. §§ 311, 313. 5 Excluded from this definition
of Militia, among others, are "members of the armed forces, except
members who are not on active duty." 10 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); accord
D.C. Code § 49-401 (District of Columbia required to enroll most
able-bodied males age 18 to 45 in militia).
In order that the ordinary civilians constituting the Militia
might function effectively, it was necessary that the people possess arms and be familiar with their use. After all, individuals
called for militia duty were "expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time."
Miller, 307 U.S. at 179. Thus, the "militia system ...implied the
general obligation of all adult male inhabitants to possess arms,
and, with certain exceptions, to cooperate in the work of defence."
Id. at 179-80 (citation omitted); see also NEW YORK JOURNAL, May
11, 1775, at 1, cols. 2-3 (recommending "to the inhabitants of this
country, capable of bearing arms, to provide themselves with arms
and ammunition, to defend their country in case of any invasion").
That a militia be "well regulated" does not mean that it must
necessarily be the subject of state control. With respect to troops,
"regulated" is defined as "properly disciplined." 7 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 380 (1933). In turn, "discipline" in relation
to arms is defined as "training in the practice of arms." 3 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 416 (1933). Notably, prerevolutionary
Americans forming voluntary associations for the purpose of resisting British rule, including Washington and Mason, employed
the term "well regulated militia" to describe their associations. 1
Kate Mason Rowland, LIFE OF GEORGE MASON 428 (1892). These
organizations were decidedly not sanctioned by any governmental
authority.
George Mason succinctly explained the logic underlying the relationship of the Second Amendment's preamble to its operative
text when he warned Virginia's ratifying convention that absent a
Bill of Rights, "[t]he militia may be here destroyed by that method
which has been practised in other parts of the world before; that

5. Congress may define that part of the Militia to which it wishes to apply its Article I
powers, but Petitioners defy logic in suggesting that the protection of a right against the
federal government may thus be legislated away by Congress. Pet. Br. 14 n.2.
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is, by rendering them useless-by disarming them." 2 Rowland, at
408.
The Second Amendment secures the pre-existing right of the
people to keep and bear arms. 6 And it does so, in part, because a
militia-comprised of the body of ordinary people proficient in the
use of their private arms-was deemed necessary. Were the people
denied their right to keep and bear arms, they could not function
as a well regulated militia.
C.

The FramersSecured an Individual Right to Keep and
Bear Arms in Reaction to the British ColonialExperience.

["The right to keep and bear arms" had a specific meaning to the Colonists, and it had nothing to do with a right
to use guns at the direction and control of a military authority. Because the other side's arguments are so heavily
rooted in historical interpretation, we dedicated a significant portion to the brief explaining how the right to arms,
and the militia, were viewed by the Framers. There is simply no competing history on these points.
The brief earlier referenced the wide acceptance of the
English right to arms and would now demonstrate that
right's role in the Revolutionary Era. The task of providing a complete exegesis of the English right to arms was
left to the very capable hands of Kevin Marshall, whose excellent brief for the Cato Institute and Professor Joyce Lee
Malcolm is the gold standard of amicus support.]
"[C]onstitutional limitations arise from grievances, real or fancied, which their makers have suffered, and should go pari passu
with the supposed evil. They withstand the winds of logic by the
depth and toughness of their roots in the past." United States v.
Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926) (L. Hand, J.). The
rights secured by the first eight amendments were not conjured at
random, but in reaction to specific outrages of the King's rule. The
Second Amendment is no exception. While Petitioners and their
amici may not believe that English law secured an individual
right to arms for self-defense, colonial Americans certainly did,
and it was the repeated, wanton violation of that right that led
them to demand and ratify the Second Amendment.
6. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (right to arms "not a right
granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument
for its existence').
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As British troops arrived in Boston to enforce the Townshend
Acts in 1768, a call went out for the people to arm themselves. Responding to British criticism of the civilian armament, Samuel
Adams declared that "it is certainly beyond human art and sophistry, to prove the British subjects, to whom the privilege of possessing arms is expressly recognized by the Bill of Rights . . . are
guilty of an illegal act, in calling upon one another to be provided
with them, as the law directs." 1 WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 299
(Harry Cushing ed., 1904). Citing Blackstone's "right of having
and using arms for self-preservation and defence," Adams added,
"[h]ow little do those persons attend to the rights of the constitution, if they know anything about them, who find fault with a late
vote of this town, calling upon the inhabitants to provide themselves with arms for their defence at any time ... " Id. at 317-18
(emphasis in original).
The "Journal of the Times" concurred:
It is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the [English] Bill of Rights, to keep arms
for their own defence; and as Mr. Blackstone observes, it is to
be made use of when the sanctions of society and law are
found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.
NEW YORK JOURNAL, Supplement, Apr. 13, 1769, at 1, col. 3.
So accepted was the notion that Americans had the right to
arms that Crown prosecutors of the soldiers charged in the Boston
Massacre invoked the victims' right to armed resistance against
abusive Redcoats. 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 149, 274 (L.
Wroth & H. Zobel eds., 1965). John Adams, in his successful defense of the soldiers, concurred: "Here every private person is authorized to arm himself, and on the strength of this authority, I do
not deny the inhabitants had a right to arm themselves at that
time, for their defence, not for offence...." Id. at 248.
Nonetheless, reports of British troops disarming Americans surfaced as early as February 1769. NEW YORK JOURNAL, Feb. 2,
1769, at 2, col. 2. And much to the dismay of the colonists, the
governing council newly appointed for Massachusetts came to
propose "the disarming of the town of Boston, and as much of the
province as might be." BOSTON GAZETTE, Sept. 5, 1774, at 3, col. 2.
The following day, Lt. General Thomas Gage, commander of the
British military in America and Massachusetts Royal Governor,
moved the powder stored at Charlestown to Castle William and
forbade the release of privately owned powder from the Boston
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magazine. The ensuing unrest came to be known as "the Powder
7
Alarm." Young, FOUNDERS' VIEW, at 37.
The citizens of Suffolk County, Massachusetts promptly issued
a proclamation denouncing the powder seizure (among other outrages). The Continental Congress quickly approved the "Suffolk
Resolves." Id. at 38. In addition to the powder seizure, "[t]he
Crown forcibly purchased arms and ammunition held in the inventory of merchants, and an order went out that the inhabitants
must turn in their arms." Stephen Halbrook, THE FOUNDERS'
SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 45

(2008) (citation omitted).
The order to disarm was apparently ignored, but British seizure
of private arms continued. "They keep a constant search for every
thing which will be serviceable in battle; and whenever they espy
any instruments which may serve or disserve them,- whether
they are the property of individuals or the public is immaterial,they are seized. .. ." Letter of Joseph Warren to Samuel Adams,
Sept. 29, 1774, in Richard Frothingham, LIFE AND TIMES OF
JOSEPH WARREN 381 (1865).
The colonists expressed their displeasure over firearms seizures.
Worcester County complained to Gage that although "the People
[are] justified in providing for their own Defense," passing through
Boston Neck entailed having "many places searched, where Arms
and Ammunition were suspected to be; and if found seized; yet as
the People have never acted offensively, nor discovered any disposition so to do, as above related, the County apprehend this can
never justify the seizure of private Property." BOSTON GAZETTE,
Oct. 17, 1774, at 2, cols. 2-3. "It is said that the troops, under your
7. Owing to the instability of black powder used in colonial times, fire
safety measures of the day mandated that large stores of gunpowder, as
those belonging to merchants, be stored in "powder houses" away from
other structures, as were powder and other arms purchased by a community for the benefit of its citizens. The 1783 Massachusetts statute
allegedly "prohibit[ing] Boston citizens from keeping loaded firearms in
their homes," Pet. Br. 42, was a fire safety measure intended to regulate
the storage of gunpowder: "An Act in Addition to the several Acts already
made for the prudent storage of Gun-Powder within the Town of Boston."
Act of Mar. 1, 1783, ch. XIII, 1783 Mass. Acts 218. The act opens with,
"Whereas the depositing of loaded Arms ... is dangerous to the Lives of
those who are disposed to exert themselves when a Fire happens to
break out," with no reference to firearms qua firearms being inherently
dangerous. Id.
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command, have seized a number of cartridges which were carrying
out of the town of Boston, into the country; and as you were
pleased to deny that you had meddled with private property ... I
would gladly be informed on what different pretence you now
meddled with those cartridges. . . ." NEWPORT MERCURY (Rhode
Island), Apr. 10, 1775, at 2, col. 1.
The British also prohibited importation of guns and powder,
prompting further outcry. "Could they [the Ministry] not have
given up their Plan for enslaving America without seizing.., all
the Arms and Ammunition? and without soliciting and finally obtaining an Order to prohibit the Importation of warlike Stores in
the

Colonies?"

NEW

HAMPSHIRE

GAZETTE

AND

HISTORICAL

CHRONICLE, Jan. 13, 1775, at 1, col. 1 (reprinted in
ARCHIVES, 4TH SERIES 1065 (Peter Force ed., 1837)).

1 AMERICAN
South Carolina's General Committee protested that "by the late prohibition of
exporting arms and ammunition from England, it too clearly appears a design of disarming the people of America, in order the
more speedily to dragoon and enslave them. . . ." 1 John Drayton,
MEMOIRS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 166 (1821).

Notwithstanding the import prohibition and occasional seizure
of private weapons, Gage understood that complete disarmament
of the population required military domination. Halbrook, THE
FOUNDERS' SECOND AMENDMENT at 49 (collecting sources). The
colonists agreed: "[I]f they should come to disarming the inhabitants, the matter is settled with the town at once; for blood and
carnage must inevitably ensue. . . ." Letter of John Andrews, Sept.
12, 1774, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL

SOCIETY 359 (1866).

Not surprisingly, the Revolution's first battle opened on April
19, 1775, with an ill-conceived British expedition to seize weapons
from private property in Concord. Fear of arms seizures prompted
Americans to transfer publicly stored weapons to their homes, and
when Redcoats came to seize public and private arms alike, war
erupted.
The immediate aftermath of Lexington and Concord found Boston cut off from the remainder of the province. Gage offered Bostonians free passage from the city provided they would deliver
their arms for safekeeping. A vote was taken and the people
agreed to Gage's terms, surrendering "1778 fire-arms, 634 pistols,
973 bayonets, and 38 blunderbusses." Richard Frothingham,
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HISTORY OF THE SIEGE OF BOSTON 95 (1851) (emphasis added).8

Gage quickly reneged on his promise of safe passage. Young,
FOUNDERS' VIEW, at 52.
Americans reacted strongly to the disarmament of Boston.
Thomas Jefferson and John Dickinson drafted a "Declaration of
the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms," issued by the Second Continental Congress on July 6, 1775. Gage's disarmament
scheme figured prominently among the "Causes" for armed revolt:
[lilt was stipulated that the said inhabitants having deposited
their arms.., should have liberty to depart, taking with them
their other effects. They accordingly delivered up their arms,
but.., the governor ordered the arms ...seized by a body of
soldiers; detained the greatest part of the inhabitants in the
town, and compelled the few who were permitted to retire, to
leave their most valuable effects behind.
2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 136-37 (1905)

(emphases added).
[The more familiar Declaration of Independence also
contains a reference to British disarmament, although one
too oblique to explore in the brief. The Declaration's complaint that King George had "ravaged our Coasts, burnt
our Towns, and destroyed the Lives of our People," references the shelling of Falmouth, Massachusetts (now Portland, Maine) as punishment for failing to guarantee the
town's good behavior with an offering of hostages and
arms. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS' SECOND
AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 107-08
(2008).]
Disarmament as a grievance became a common theme among
the Patriots. For example, addressing Indian tribes in search of
alliance, Samuel Adams complained that the British "have told us
we shall have no more guns, no powder to use.... How can you
live without powder and guns? But we hope to supply you soon
with both, of our own making." 3 WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS
212-13.
That the colonists cared little about the prospect of having their
guns seized is not the only a historical concept underlying Peti8.

Another account repeats these numbers, save for 700 fewer bayonets.

Ramsay, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 176 (1789).

1 David

Boston's 1765 population

totaled 15,520. EARLY CENSUS MAKING IN MASSACHUSEWS, 1643-1765, 102 (1902).
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tioners' repudiation of the Second Amendment. Redcoats and Patriots alike would have puzzled at Petitioners' notion that the
Revolution produced an exclusive governmental right to operate
an organized militia. The "well regulated militia" of the American
Revolution operated not merely beyond the control of, but in direct
challenge to, the King's governors.
In Massachusetts, as in other colonies, militia officers were
elected from among the militiamen. This "meant that [officers]
appointed by the Royal governor would be thrown out. The Provincial Congress further usurped the Crown's militia power by
appointing a Committee of Safety that could call out the militia
when necessary." Halbrook, FOUNDERS' SECOND AMENDMENT at
48 (citation omitted). Gage recognized this process as a threat to
British rule:
The Officers of the Militia have in most Places been forced to
resign their Commissions, And the Men choose their Officers,
who are frequently made and unmade; and I shall not be surprized, as the Provincial Congress seems to proceed higher
and higher in their Determinations, if Persons should be Authorized by them to grant Commissions and Assume every
Power of a legal Government....
1 PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER, 14TH PARLIAMENT, 1ST SESSION
58 (1802).
North Carolina's colonial governor, Josiah Martin, decried the
new militias that "submit to the illegal and usurped authorities of
[patriotic] Committees." William Hoyt, THE MECKLENBURG
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 44 (1907); see also Vernon
Stumpf, JOSIAH MARTIN 112 (1986) ("they are now actually endeavoring to form what they call independent Companies under
my nose"). Virginia's Governor, Lord Dunmore, complained that
"[e]very County is now Arming a Company of men whom they call
an independent Company for the avowed purpose of protecting
their Committee, and to be employed against Government if occasion require." Letter to Earl of Dartmouth, Dec. 24, 1774, in 2
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 445 n.1 (Worthington Ford
ed., 1889). Loyalists were horrified by the rise of extragovernmental militias, but Patriots such as John Adams would have none of
the criticism:
"The new-fangled militia," as the specious [Loyalist] calls it, is
such a militia as he never saw. They are commanded through
the province, not by men who procured their commissions
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from a governor as a reward for making themselves pimps to
his tools, and by discovering a hatred of the people, but by
gentlemen, whose estates, abilities, and benevolence have
rendered them the delight of the soldiers....
4 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 40-41 (1865).
Indeed, extra-governmental militias existed even in times of
good relations with the Crown. Pennsylvania, owing to Quaker
influence, was alone among the colonies in not having a governmentally organized militia for most of its history. But this did not
mean that a militia was unneeded in Pennsylvania, or that the
colony lacked for means of defense. Responding to the depredations of privateers on the Delaware River, Benjamin Franklin published Plain Truth in 1747, warning of dire consequences were the
people, though well-armed, to remain unprepared. 3 WORKS OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 1-21 (Jared Sparks ed., 1882). Franklin
quickly followed Plain Truth with Form of Association, laying out
a vision of voluntary mutual self-defense "Associations" palatable
to the religiously scrupulous. The Associations would be freely
formed by individuals electing their own officers, with neither offensive intent nor governmental compulsion or oversight. 3
PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 205 (Leonard Labaree ed., 1961).
Franklin's vision triumphed, the 1747 Association enrolling
10,000 men. William Shepherd, 6 HISTORY OF PROPRIETARY
GOVERNMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA 530 (1896). But not everyone was
comfortable with the arrangement:
It strongly resembles treason. The people should have desired
the president and council to appoint officers for their training,
and put themselves under their direction .... This is erecting
a government within a government, and rebelling against the
king's authority.
Id. (quoting Letter of Thomas Penn to Mr. Peters (March 30,
1748)). The King in Council disallowed a 1755 law granting formal
recognition of the voluntary associations, but Pennsylvanians continued their voluntary armed association in times of need. Young,
FOUNDERS' VIEW, 20-23.
John Adams explicitly clarified that militia forces served their
purpose regardless of whether they were organized pursuant to
law. In the First Continental Congress, Adams proposed a resolution
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that it be recommended to all the Colonies, to establish by
Provincial Laws, where it can be done, a regular well furnished, and disciplined Militia, and where it cannot be done
by Law, by voluntary Associations, and private Agreements.
1 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 132 (Paul Smith ed.,
1976).
[Nothing else more clearly reveals the Framers' view that
people could act as well-regulated militia without government approval.]
As war approached, clashes between voluntary militias and colonial governors became not merely philosophical, but physical.
When Governor Dunmore seized the powder at Williamsburg, Patrick Henry's Hanover Independent Militia Company forced restitution. R.D. Meade, PATRICK HENRY 50-51 (1969). One paper reported that as a "party of the militia being at exercise on Boston
common, a party of the army surrounded them and took away
their fire arms; immediately thereupon a larger party of the militia assembled, pursued the Army, and retook their fire arms."
MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, Dec. 29, 1774, at 2, col. 2.
Militia forces operating without the government's blessing
would prove critical to the American war effort. For example, the
first American military offensive of the Revolution, Ethan Allen's
capture of Fort Ticonderoga, was accomplished by "two hundred
undisciplined men, with small arms, without a single bayonet...."
Ira Allen, THE NATURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF

VERMONT 44 (reprint 1969).
Respondent does not suggest that members of private paramilitary organizations have a right to commit violent acts under the
auspices of acting as a citizen militia. See, e.g., Va. Code § 18.2433.2; Cal. Penal Code § 11460. The Framers, who organized the
militia under the new constitution, doubtless agreed that citizens
should not compete with legitimate government authority. "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established
Manshould not be changed for light and transient Causes ....
sufferable,
than
Evils
are
suffer,
while
disposed
to
kind are more
to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S.
1776).

But as expressed in the Declaration, the Framers saw no tension between accepting the lawful authority of an imperfect and
even frequently unjust government, while retaining the ability to
resist tyranny. The notion that independent, armed militia would
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engage in the treason and insurrection forbidden by the Constitution is spurious. The Framers, who used militia organized in direct defiance of the government they deposed, envisioned the militia as a tool for restoring the Constitution in the event of usurpation. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton).
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly
been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation
and arbitrary power of rulers; and it will generally, even if
these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to
resist and triumph over them.

2 Story, COMMENTARIES, supra, at 607.
Cooley agreed, explaining that the Second Amendment "is significant as having been reserved by the people as a possible and
necessary resort for the protection of self-government against
usurpation, and against any attempt on the part of those who may
for the time be in possession of State authority or resources to set
aside the constitution and substitute their own rule for that of the
people." Thomas Cooley, The Abnegation of Self-Government, 12
PRINCETON REV. 209, 213-14 (1883). The individual use of SecondAmendment-protected arms to check despotism, "far from being
revolutionary, would be in strict accord with popular right and
duty." Id.
The Second Amendment is a doomsday provision, one designed for those exceptionally rare circumstances where all
other rights have failed-where the government refuses to
stand for reelection and silences those who protest; where
courts have lost the courage to oppose, or can find no one to
enforce their decrees. However improbable these contingencies may seem today, facing them unprepared is a mistake a
free people get to make only once.
Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The Framers intended the Second Amendment to guard against "[o]ne of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish their purposes without
resistance [which is] by disarming the people, and making it an
offence to keep arms, and by substituting a regular army in the
stead of a resort to the militia." Joseph Story, A FAMILIAR
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EXPOSITION ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 264

(1847).
Certainly Petitioners would not dispute Americans' justification
for revolting against Great Britain, an event that would not have
been possible without the private ownership of firearms. And
should our Nation someday suffer tyranny again, preservation of
the right to keep and bear arms would enhance the people's ability
to act as militia in the manner practiced by the Framers.
[Here the brief veers off into legislative history, an approach I personally disfavor but which was necessary considering how heavily the other side relies upon this mode
of interpretation. In any event, the Second Amendment's
legislative history, fully and properly examined, fully supports the individual rights model.]
That the Second Amendment was designed to secure a personal
right of the citizens is clear from Madison's notes for the speech
introducing the Bill of Rights. "They [the proposed amendments]
relate first to private rights," 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 19394 (C. Hobson et al. eds., 1979). Madison thus initially proposed
placing the Second Amendment alongside other provisions securing individual rights in Article I, sec. 9-following the habeas corpus privilege and the proscriptions against bills of attainder and
ex post facto laws, together with his proposed protections for
speech, press, and assembly. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 169 (N. Cogan ed.,

1997).
If "bear arms" had the exclusively military connotation urged by
Petitioners, no one would have proposed qualifying the phrase
with "for the common defence." But the Senate rejected just that
proposal. JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 77 (1820). Some collective rights adherents speculate that "common defence" was considered redundant, but more plausibly the Senate did not wish to narrow "bear
arms" to a purely military usage. After all, the first Congress
knew how to condition individual rights on militia service. E.g.,
U.S. CONST. amend. V (no presentment or indictment right "in
cases arising in... the Militia, when in actual service... .")9

9. Petitioners claim that the "common defence" language was scrapped as an excessive
and controversial revision to the Constitution's body, Pet. Br. At 29 n.6, contradicting their
claim that the Second Amendment was intended to remedy deficiencies in the Constitution's militia clauses. E.g., Pet. Br. 22, 33.
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Indeed, House debates on the Second Amendment reveal the
Framers' reluctance to adopt text that might denigrate the individual character of the right to arms. Collectivists assert that a
proposal to include a conscientious objector clause in the Second
Amendment confirms the military character of "bear arms." But
the proposal was defeated after Rep. Gerry warned "that this
clause would give an opportunity to the people in power to destroy
the constitution itself. They can declare who are those religiously
scrupulous, and prevent them from bearing arms." 1 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS 778 (1834).
Representative Scott's objection to the conscientious objector
language not only reflected the individual character of the Second
Amendment, but also the distinct nature of "keep" and "bear": He
said the language would "lead to the violation of another article in
the constitution, which secures to the people the right of keeping
arms. . . ." Id. at 796. Petitioners' claim that "[a]ll remarks recorded in the House's debate related to military service; none pertained to private use of weapons, including self-defense," Pet. Br.
28 (citations omitted), is conclusory-true only if one accepts that
"bear arms" as used by Gerry, and the people's "right of keeping
arms" as used by Scott, referred to military service. But that construction is insupportable.
Equally unpersuasive is the notion that the defeated conscientious objector clause's military nature imparted a military flavor
to what remained and passed as the Second Amendment. Other
amendments, as passed, contain unrelated concepts. The First
Amendment secures various rights of expression and conscience,
yet nobody would contend Madison intended to protect only religious speech or assembly. Likewise, the Fifth Amendment's Grand
Jury Clause appears only tenuously related to the Takings Clause.
No particular intent can be gleaned from a legislative combination
of seemingly unrelated subjects, especially when anomalous provisions are omitted before final passage. 10
[The conscientious objector clause is found in the 19th
paragraph of Virginia's proposed Bill of Rights, not the
17th paragraph admitted by the city to be the Second
Amendment's source.

10. Notably, Madison's initial Second Amendment draft starts with the right to keep
and bear arms, separated from the remaining provisions with a semicolon - the same punctuation Madison used to distinguish unrelated concepts in the First and Fifth Amendments.
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19th. That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing
arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an
equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.
Proposed Declaration of Rights and other Amendments,
Virginia Convention, June 27, 1788, reprinted in DAVID E.
YOUNG, THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 459 (2d ed.
2001).]
Petitioners claim that the Second Amendment is derived from
the seventeenth of certain amendments proposed by Virginia, and
that Virginia "[s]eparately . . . proposed amending the Militia
Clauses directly: '11th-That each state respectively shall have
the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining its
own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide
for the same.' " Pet. Br. 26 (citation omitted). Yet both proposals
originated in the same document, the Second Amendment's precursor among provisions "constituting the bill of rights," and the
militia amendment among what the convention labeled "[t]he
other amendments." David Young, THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT 462 (2d ed. 2001).
If guaranteeing the people's "right to keep and bear arms," with
reference to a "well regulated militia" and "a free state," were intended to secure the states a right to arm their militias, the Virginia Convention would not have separately proposed an explicit
reservation of the states' militia powers. That the Second Amendment's direct precursor came to Congress in a "bill of rights,"
alongside a state militia power among "other amendments,"
strongly suggests the two are not identical.
[The fact that Virginia proposed the Second Amendment
source language alongside a separate state militia powers
amendment that would have explicitly had such an effect
should be "game, set, and match" for collectivists who
would look to bolster their theory with legislative history.
Here is the language of Virginia's right to arms proposal,
which the city admitted to be the source of the Second
Amendment, in context:
15th. That the people have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for the common good, or to instruct their representatives; and that every freeman
has a right to petition or apply to the legislature for
redress of grievances.
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16th. That the people have a right to freedom of
speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments;
that the freedom of the press is one of the greatest
bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be violated.
17th. That the people have a right to keep and bear
arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of the
body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state; that standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and
therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the community will admit;
and that, in all cases, the military should be under
strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil
power.
Proposed Declaration of Rights and other Amendments,
Virginia Convention, June 27, 1788, reprinted in DAVID E.
YOUNG, THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 458-59 (2d
ed. 2001).]
Indeed, if rejected language is any clue as to the meaning of that
which was accepted, perhaps the most telling example was the
Framers' rejection of the following proposed amendment: "That
each State respectively shall have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same ...
." FIRST
SENATE JOURNAL 126.
This proposal stated, in unmistakably direct and concise fashion, exactly that meaning which Petitioners would divine in the
Second Amendment through tortured linguistics, fanciful explanations, and "hidden history." And it was rejected by the Framers.
"[H]istory does not warrant concluding that it necessarily follows
from the pairing of the concepts that a person has a right to bear
arms solely in his function as a member of the militia." Robert
Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 AM. BAR ASS'N J. 554, 557
(1965).11
The Bill of Rights was never thought necessary by the Federalists, other than as a tool to placate Anti-Federalist resistance to
the new constitution. While rejection of militia-powers amend11. The ABA, founded in 1878, notes it has taken the opposite view "[flor more than
forty years." ABA Br. 2. Sprecher's article won the ABA's 1964 Samuel Pool Weaver Constitutional Law Essay Competition.
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ments demonstrates that the Bill of Rights did not address each
and every Anti-Federalist concern, the Second Amendment did at
least address a different concern: the individual right to arms.
[I am always surprised when the other side dismisses
clear and unmistakable individual right to arms demands
made by the Anti-Federalists on grounds that the AntiFederalists were the political losers of the day. It is common knowledge that the Bill of Rights came into being because its absence was a key Anti-Federalist objection to the
Constitution. And although the Anti-Federalists failed to
block the Constitution's ratification, its immediate
amendment with a Bill of Rights was a testament to the
fact that the new government required broader acceptance
than that which was obtained in the ratifying conventions.
The other side's "Anti-Federalists As Losers" argument is
also inconsistent with its claims that the Second Amendment was somehow a rearrangement of the balance of military power between the federal government and the states.
We are asked to believe that explicit demands for an individual right widely accepted at the time were ignored because these demands came from political losers, but that
those same losers forced Madison to have the central government immediately forfeit its new monopoly on military
force. The proposition is untenable. The Anti-Federalists
forced adoption of a Bill of Rights securing uncontroversial, popular individual rights, but they were in no position
to re-arrange or dismantle key features of the newlyformed federal government.]
Demands for a bill of rights prevailed in five of seven constitutional ratifying conventions. The only provisions common to all
were freedom of religion and the right to arms. New Hampshire's
convention demanded recognition that "Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion." 1 Elliot, DEBATES at 326. Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists
demanded
that the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of
themselves and their own State, or the United States, or for
the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for
disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals.
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Levy, ORIGINS, supra at 143-44.12 In Massachusetts, Samuel

Adams demanded that "the said constitution be never construed..
. to prevent the people of the United States who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms." DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS
IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

86 (1856). These were the sentiments Madison addressed in the
Second Amendment..
Petitioners' notion that the Second Amendment secures state
prerogatives to control their militia free of federal interference-as
a limitation or repudiation of congressional militia powers-also
contradicts the substantial body of precedent interpreting Congress's authority over the militia. As early as 1820, this Court held
that Congress had preempted the field of militia regulation:
Upon the subject of the militia, Congress has exercised the
powers conferred on that body by the constitution, as fully as
was thought right, and has thus excluded the power of legislation by the States on these subjects, except so far as it has
been permitted by Congress; although it should be conceded,
that important provisions have been omitted, or that others
which have been made might have been more extended, or
more wisely devised.
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 24 (1820) (Washington,
J.). Dissenting from Houston's conclusion that state courts had
concurrent jurisdiction over militia courts-martial, Justice Story
(joined by Chief Justice Marshall) nevertheless observed that "a
State might organize, arm, and discipline its own militia in the
.
absence of, or subordinate to, the regulations of Congress ...
Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 52 (Story, J., dissenting). The Second Amendment "may not, perhaps, be thought to have any important bearing on this point. If it have, it confirms and illustrates, rather than impugns the reasoning already suggested." Id.
at 52-53.
This Court would later make clear that with the adoption of the
Constitution, "[t]here was left therefore under the sway of the
States undelegated the control of the militia to the extent that
such control was not taken away by the exercise by Congress of its
power to raise armies." Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366,
383 (1918). And just as Congress may pre-empt the regulation of
12. As did the Virginia majority, the Anti-Federalist Pennsylvania minority proposed a
separate state-militia-powers amendment. Id.
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the states' militias under Article I, it likewise enjoys the exclusive
power to call the states' militias into federal service, which has
been delegated to the President since 1795. Martin v. Mott, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
1, 43-44 (1849). Indeed, while Congress permits the states to
maintain a voluntary defense force immune from federal conscription, 32 U.S.C. § 109(c), that part of the militia organized into the
National Guard is under plenary federal control, such that a
state's governor may not object to the President's training of
Guard units overseas. Perpich, 496 U.S. 334. Petitioners' Second
Amendment theory defies each of these precedents.
Petitioners are not the first to make this mistake. In 1863,
Pennsylvania's Supreme Court enjoined the conscription of Union
soldiers, theorizing that the Civil War draft violated the state's
militia powers. Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238, 259 (1863). One Justice invoked Petitioners' view of the Second Amendment to support the decision. Id. at 271-72 (Thompson, J., concurring). The
court quickly reversed itself. Id. at 295. If Petitioners' derision of
the individual right to arms as proposing treason or insurrection,
Pet. Br. 15 n.3, questions the legitimacy of America's Revolution,
their view of the Second Amendment's impact on the allocation of
federal-state power would threaten the Union itself.
Petitioners' collective-purpose interpretation is also at odds with
this Court's only direct Second Amendment opinion in Miller. In
examining whether Miller had a right to possess his sawed-off
shotgun, this Court never asked whether Miller was part of any
state-authorized military organization. "Had the lack of [militia]
membership or engagement been a ground of the decision in
Miller, the Court's opinion would obviously have made mention of
it. But it did not." United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 224
(5th Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted). Indeed, the government advanced the collectivist theory as its first argument in Miller,
PA40a, but the Court ignored it. The Court asked only whether
the gun at issue was of a type Miller would be constitutionally
privileged in possessing.
II.

WASHINGTON, D.C.'S HANDGUN BANS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

To determine whether a particular weapon falls within the Second Amendment's protection, the Court need not apply any particular standard of review. The question is categorical, identical in
kind to the questions courts routinely answer in determining what
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constitutes "religion" or "speech" under the First Amendment, or
what constitutes a "search" or "seizure" under the Fourth.
Answering such questions is often a requisite first step in
evaluating the constitutionality of governmental action. Only if
protected speech is found will a court examine the permissibility
of a particular burden on it; only if an officer has searched or
seized a citizen will the reasonableness of the action be examined.
With respect to Petitioners' handgun ban, answering the
threshold question resolves the case. If the possession of handguns
is protected by the Second Amendment, handguns cannot be completely banned, however else the government may regulate their
possession and use. 13 The fact that a type of arm is protected by
the Second Amendment defeats Petitioners' attempt to position
this case as a "standard of review" question, such that the government may ban any arms it deems too dangerous even if such
arms are traditionally used for lawful civilian purposes. After all,
Petitioners can conjure a rationale for banning any "arm."14 Certainly the government may ban arms that are not protected by the
Second Amendment and regulate those that are, but the threshold
question of whether an arm falls into the former or latter category
cannot be avoided.
Nor may the government justify a ban on a particular firearm
simply by claiming to allow the possession of others. While it is a
dubious proposition that Petitioners allow individuals any firearms for private home use, the government's compliance with the
Constitution by allowing rifles would not permit the government
to violate the Constitution by banning handguns-any more than
the government could prohibit books because it permits newspapers and considers them an "adequate substitute." The court be15
low properly termed this argument "frivolous." PA53a.
[The argument works equally well for freedom of worship. The government cannot limit one's choice of religion
13. Petitioners' claim that no "per se" categorical restrictions exist within the Bill of
Rights, Pet. Br. at 44, is false. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) ("a law imposing criminal penalties on
protected speech is a stark example of speech suppression'); cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that "traditional legal categories" are "preferable to... ad hoc
balancing").
14. Indeed, until 1993, the city even banned mace. Now legal, "self-defense sprays"
must be registered with the police. D.C. Code § 7-2502.14.
15. Petitioners implicitly concede the point in admitting that "banning all gun possession"-presumably without impacting the possession of other "arms"-would violate the
Second Amendment. Pet. Br. 43.
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on grounds that the approved faiths sufficiently satisfy
one's spiritual needs. The concept of having a right means
that the government presumably cannot dictate or limit
the manner in which that right is exercised. To ban a gun,
a book, a medical procedure, or a faith, the government
must show one has no right to these things-not point to
the availability of other options. A right to only that which
is permitted is not much of a right.]
The test for whether a particular weapon is or is not within the
Second Amendment's protection was established in Miller. For all
the claims that the D.C. Circuit failed to follow Miller, it is Petitioners and their amici-including the Solicitor General-who reject that precedent.
Miller's conceptual framework is plain. First, this Court inquires whether a weapon "at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia," meaning that the weapon is "any part of the ordinary military
equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense." Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. Second, the Court explained that
when fulfilling the Second Amendment's militia rationale, people
"were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves
and of the kind in common use at the time." Id. at 179. The assumption is that at least some arms of the kind people would use
for ordinary civilian purposes- arms in "common use at the
time"-would also be the arms used in militia service. This is fully
consistent with the historical record, supra at 29.16 It is also consistent with the understanding of "arms" at the time. "In law,
arms are any thing which a man takes in his hand in anger, to
strike or assault another." WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra at 11
("Arms").
In sum, an "arm" is protected under the Miller test if it is of the
type that (1) civilians would use, such that they could be expected
to possess it for ordinary lawful purposes (in the absence of, or
even despite, legal prohibition), and (2) would be useful in militia
service. The latter requirement may be in tension with the preexisting right to keep and bear arms, which is not always related
16. Miller's earlier use of "at this time," id. at 178, makes clear that the relevant time
period is the present, not 1791. The Framers clearly intended to preserve people's ability to
act as militia, and would not have expected future generations to have obsolete weapons in
"common use" any more than the Framers would have expected to secure only 18th-century
religions or media. The lineal descendents of personal arms of the type in predictable civilian usage are thus protected, but modem weapons of the type that serve no ordinary civilian function are not.
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to militia service. 17 In that respect, Miller may be in tension with
itself. There is no justification to limit the Second Amendment's
protection to arms that have military utility.
But as a practical matter, the second prong adds nothing to the
analysis in virtually all cases, including this one. Categorically,
firearms "in common use" for civilian purposes-rifles, shotguns,
and handguns-are plainly "part of the ordinary military equipment," and their "use could contribute to the common defense."
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. The D.C. Circuit's opinion is thus compatible with Miller, because handguns meet both Miller criteria.
Arms that may have great military utility but which are inappropriate for civilian purposes are still sensibly excluded from the
Second Amendment's protection, as civilians would not commonly
use them.
The Miller test for whether a particular arm is constitutionally
protected is hardly "unworkable." Pet. Br. 44. To the contrary,
Miller presents a straightforward constitutional question, lending
itself to practical application far more readily than questions of
whether a search is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, or
at what point "government entanglement" with religion becomes
so "excessive" as to violate the First Amendment. Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). To the extent Miller can be
read as establishing a "lineal descent" rule, this Court already applies precisely that framework in its Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. For example, parties in discrimination lawsuits are not
denied access to civil juries simply because discrimination claims
were unknown in 1791. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94
(1974).
In cases of unusual or exotic arms, or where the court lacks familiarity with a particular weapon, e.g., Miller, 307 U.S. at 178,
courts may wish to receive evidence regarding whether a weapon
has ordinary civilian application and can be traced to a form historically used by militia forces. But in most cases, as here, the answer will be clear.
No court has questioned that a handgun, generally, is an arm
"of the kind in common use" by the public and is either "ordinary
military equipment" or otherwise useful in a manner that "could
17. "Attempting to draw a ling between the ownership and use of 'Arms' for private
purposes and the ownership and use of 'Arms' for militia purposes would have been an
extremely silly exercise on the part of the First Congress if indeed the very survival of the
militia depended on men who would bring their commonplace, private arms with them to
muster." PA43a (emphasis in original).
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contribute to the common defense." Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. As below, the Fifth Circuit experienced no difficulty applying the Miller
test to handguns. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227 n.22. Even courts hostile to the Second Amendment's individual nature likewise accept
that handguns are the type of arms referenced in the Amendment.
In adopting the collective-rights theory "without further analysis
or citation of authority," Emerson, 270 F.3d at 224, the First Circuit conceded that a revolver would fall within the Miller test's
ambit, as a handgun "may be capable of military use [and] familiarity with it might be regarded as of value in training a person to
use a comparable weapon of military type and caliber." Cases v.
United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922-23 (1st Cir. 1942); see also
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir.
1982) ("Handguns are undisputedly the type of arms commonly
used for recreation or the protection of person and property") (internal citations omitted).
Indeed, this Court has not required any evidentiary hearing to
determine that "pistols . . . may be supposed to be needed occasionally for self-defence." Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138,
143 (1914). That handguns are appropriate tools for lawful selfdefense and are a class of weapon "of the kind in common use,"
Miller, 307 U.S. at 179, has been within the judicial notice of this
Court and lower federal courts for nearly a century. Nearly forty
percent of firearms produced today are handguns. See BATFE Report, http://www.atf.treas.gov/firearms/stats/afmer/afmer2006.pdf.
Congress's specific description of pistols as militia weapons in
the Second Militia Act, so soon following passage of the Second
Amendment, offers conclusive proof that handguns are within the
Second Amendment's protection. PA50a-51a. In defining handguns as militia weapons, Congress broke no new ground. The Continental Congress likewise reported pistols as acceptable militia
weapons, 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 741-42
(1922), as had the various states. See, e.g., ACTS AND LAWS OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT 150 (1784); STATUTES OF THE STATE OF
NORTH CAROLINA 592 (1791).

Eighteenth-century American governments recognized handguns as militia arms not only due to their military utility, but also
owing to the deep roots of civilian handgun ownership from the
dawn of the Nation's settlement. Thirteen percent of firearms
listed in the Plymouth Colony's probate records from the 1670s
were pistols, "and 54.5 percent of lead projectiles recovered from
Plymouth Colony digs were pistol ammunition." Clayton Cramer
and Joseph Olson, Pistols, Crime, and Public Safety in Early
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America,
WILLAMETTE
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2008),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081403 (citation omitted). Two weeks
before the Boston Tea Party, John Andrews observed " 'twould
puzzle any person to purchase a pair of p_s [pistols] in town, as
they are all bought up, with a full determination to repell force by
force." Letter of December 1, 1773 in LETTERS OF JOHN ANDREWS,
ESQ., OF BOSTON, 1772-1776, 12 (Winthrop Sargent ed., 1866).
Some of those pistols might have been purchased by the Tea
Party Indians, "each arm'd with a hatchet or axe, and pair pistoles." Id. Letter of December 18, 1773. The 634 pistols confiscated
by General Gage constituted a full 18.25% of the firearms whose
seizure the Continental Congress declared a causus belli.
Petitioners and their amici greatly overstate our Nation's history of handgun regulation. Washington, D.C.'s complete handgun
ban was the first such prohibition on American soil since the
Revolution. The fact that "never before in the more than two hundred years of our Republic has a gun law been struck down by the
federal courts as a violation of the Second Amendment," Brady Br.
29, is a testament to the extreme nature of Petitioners' enactments. Notably, Petitioners' state amici do not defend or endorse a
total handgun ban, which none of them maintains. New York Br.
1,2.
The oft-cited case of Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840), upheld prohibition of carrying certain knives and daggers, not guns,
as suggested by some. E.g., ABA Br. 9; Chicago Br. 14 n.15, 32;
LDF Br. 15-16.18 When Tennessee's Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of banning (as opposed to regulating) the carrying of handguns, it struck down the law. State v. Andrews, 50
Tenn. 165 (1871). On occasion, the carrying of guns has been required in this country. See, e.g., 19 COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE
STATE OF GEORGIA, PART 1, 138 (1911) (churchgoer "shall carry
with him a gun, or a pair of pistols, in good order and fit for service, with at least six charges of gun-powder and ball, and shall
take the said gun or pistols with him to the pew or seat").
Various briefs invoke Georgia's 1837 ban on the sale of certain
pistols, Appleseed Br. 13; Law Professors Br. 18; Chicago Br. 14,
but none mentions that the act was struck down-on Second
Amendment grounds-in an as-applied challenge by a man who
openly wore a prohibited pistol. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
18. Aymette expressly upheld the "unqualified right to keep" arms. he "unqualified
right to keep" arms. Aymette, 21 Tenn. At 160.
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Oakland does not ban all handguns, LDF Br. 20, a measure that
would be impermissible under California law. Fiscal v. City and
County of San Francisco, __ P.3d __, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 21
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2008). The cited measure addressed a specific type of handgun thought unsuitable for legitimate purposes.
Major Cities Br. 9.
No trial is required to establish that handguns continue to be in
common use for legitimate purposes and that their possession can
contribute to the common defense. Handguns are therefore protected arms under Miller, and the right to "keep" them "shall not
be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II.
That the "keeping" at issue here relates to the home is significant. Even obscene materials not otherwise protected by the First
Amendment may be viewed in the privacy of one's home. Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The exercise of Second Amendment rights within the home is entitled to no less protection. "The
government bears a heavy burden when attempting to justify an
expansion, as in gun control, of the 'limited circumstances' in
which intrusion into the privacy of a home is permitted." Quilici,
695 F.2d at 280 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
The Solicitor General greatly overstates the D.C. Circuit decision's implications for laws governing machineguns. Courts understand that the decision below striking down the handgun bans
"address[es] only the possession of handguns, not machine guns."
Somerville v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 412 at *4
(W.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2008). And unlike the laws at issue here banning handguns, 19 federal law does not ban the private possession
of machineguns, of which approximately 120,000 are in lawful civilian possession. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Selected Findings:
Guns
Used
in
Crime
4
(July
1995),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/guic.pdf (240,000 registered
machineguns); Gary Kleck, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND
THEIR CONTROL 108 (1997) (half of registered machineguns are in
civilian use) (citing BATF, Statistics Listing of Registered Weapons, Apr. 19, 1989).20
"ATF's interest is not in determining why a law-abiding individual wishes to possess a certain firearm or device, but rather in
ensuring that such objects are not criminally misused." Testimony
19. This case does not address Petitioners' machinegun ban, D.C. Code § 22-4514(a).
20. Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) prohibits the civilian transfer or possession of machineguns
not lawfully possessed by May 19, 1986, exempting previously authorized machineguns.
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of Stephen Higgins, BATF Director, in Hearings on H.R. 641 and
Related Bills, House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime,
98th Congress 111 (1986). To that end, federal law subjects machinegun possession to the same stringent regulatory regime considered in Miller. 26 U.S.C. § 5801, et seq.; 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.98,
479.84, et seq. These regulations work: "it is highly unusual-and
in fact, it is very, very rare," that legally owned machineguns are
criminally misused. Higgins, supra, at 117.
Had Miller possessed a machinegun, this Court would presumably have had little trouble finding that the weapon had militia
utility. The Court might nonetheless have held that machineguns
fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment's protection as
they were not "in common use at the time" such that civilians
could be expected to have possessed them for ordinary lawful purposes. Miller, 307 U.S. at 179.
And even if this Court had accepted that some machineguns are
protected by the Second Amendment, their current tight regulation under federal law could well pass any level of scrutiny devised
by this Court for the regulation of protected arms. Of course, Respondent's simple revolver is no machinegun, and the types of restrictions imposed by the National Firearms Act-including an
FBI background check, $200 tax, authorization from one's local
chief law enforcement officer, and a statement of "reasonable necessity"-would be inappropriate to apply to a common handgun.
But this case is not about what regulations ought to govern machineguns. The question is whether the arms at issue-including
handguns-are protected at all. They are.
[The Solicitor General did not invoke the word "machinegun" ten times in his brief in order to help us. I am
constantly amazed by the machine gun afficionados who
think that a viable theory of the Second Amendment would
protect the private ownership of machine guns. There is
not one federal judge in the land who would agree with
such a proposition.]
III. WASHINGTON, D. C."SFUNCTIONAL FIREARMS BAN IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Petitioners concede that if the Second Amendment protects an
individual right, "a law that purported to eliminate that right-for
instance, by banning all gun possession, or allowing only a firearm
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that was so ineffective that the law effected functional disarmament," would be unconstitutional. Pet. Br. 43-44.21 The only dispute is whether D.C. Code section 7-2507.02 "effects functional
disarmament."
Determining whether section 7-2507.02 effects functional disarmament requires no fact-finding. And as Petitioners concede, a
functional firearms ban would be unconstitutional "whatever [a
Legislature's] reasons" might be for enacting it. Pet. Br. 43. Making matters easier, Petitioners agree that section 7-2507.02 "would
be unreasonable" if it offered no provision for home self-defense.
Pet. Br. 56.
The statutory language is unequivocal: without exception, individuals may never possess a functional firearm at home. If Petitioners had wished to create an exception for home self-defense,
they knew how to do so. Section 7-2507.02 permits functional firearms "at [a] place of business, or while being used for lawful recreational purposes." Petitioners cannot "turn a few passages in the
legislative history that are partially contrary to the statutory language into a justification for this court to rewrite the statute,"
Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 673 F.2d 507, 514 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and
thereby add a saving exemption for home self-defense. "[T]his
court will not read into a statute language that is clearly not
there .... The express inclusion of one (or more) thing(s) implies
the exclusion of other things from similar treatment." Castellon v.
United States, 864 A.2d 141, 148-49 (D.C. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Indeed, the city successfully asserted a reason for "distinguish[ing] between a home and a business establishment in the
Act." McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 755 (D.C.1978). Petitioners cannot now be heard to argue for judicial alteration of the
home-business distinction, especially as they can offer no guidelines as to when, exactly, a citizen might render her firearm operational to respond to a perceived threat. Resp. to Pet. for Cert.
at 19-21.
Respondent would not quarrel with a true "safe storage" law,
properly crafted to address Petitioners' stated concerns. But as
McIntosh reveals, the city said what it meant and meant what it
21. Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("the right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel") (citation omitted); Planned Parenthoodv.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) ("undue burden exists" if law's "purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability").
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said in prohibiting armed self-defense inside private homes. The
law, as written and defended by the city, is unconstitutional.
IV.

THE STANDARD OFREVIEW IN SECOND AMENDMENT
CASES IS STRICT SCRUTINY

Although Petitioners "do[ ] not suggest that gun regulations
should be subject to mere rational basis review," Pet. Br. 43, the
true nature of their proposed "reasonableness" standard is exposed by their claims that the Nation's most draconian gun laws
are constitutional. The Solicitor General's supposed "heightened"
scrutiny standard is scarcely better, demanding that judges weigh
conflicting and disputable scientific claims to determine the constitutionality of disarming law-abiding individuals, apparently on
22
an as-applied basis.
As explained supra and accepted by the court below, this case
does not require the application of any standard of review, because
it involves a ban on a class of weapons protected under Miller, and
a statutory interpretation dispute concerning whether a particular
provision enacts a functional firearms ban.
Nonetheless, should the Court venture to comment on the standard of review governing the regulation of Second Amendment
rights, it should do so consistent with well-established precedent.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938);
cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33
(1973) (fundamental rights are those "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution"). Fundamental rights are those "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental [and] implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Justice Story's
"palladium of the liberties" ought to qualify, whether the Second
Amendment entails the right to defend one's life, the right to resist tyrannical usurpation of constitutional authority, or even, as
Petitioners would have it, a right guaranteeing states freedom and
22. The Solicitor General's "reasonable alternative" test would demand that individuals
wishing to exercise a fundamental constitutional right demonstrate their need to do so,
subject to the skeptical review of officials hostile to the right. For example, a would-be
handgun owner might have to show that she was physically incapable of using a rifle or
shotgun. The Miller test anticipates this problem: Because handguns are in common use
they are constitutionally protected, meaning an individual has the right to choose a handgun as the type of weapon she would keep at home for lawful purposes.
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security. See Eugene Volokh, Necessary to the Security of a Free
State, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2007).
Today the Court is told that private gun ownership is too dangerous to be counted among first-tier enumerated rights. Americans who suffered British rule might disagree. BOSTON GAZETTE,
Dec. 5, 1774, at 4, col. 1 ("But what most irritated the People next
to seizing their Arms and Ammunition, was the apprehending [of ]
six gentlemen.., who had assembled a Town meeting .... "). As
our Nation continues to face the scourges of crime and terrorism,
no provision of the Bill of Rights would be immune from demands
that perceived governmental necessity overwhelm the very standard by which enumerated rights are secured. Exorbitant claims
of authority to deny basic constitutional rights are not unknown.
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
Demoting the Second Amendment to some lower tier of enumerated rights is unwarranted. The Second Amendment has the distinction of securing the most fundamental rights of all-enabling
the preservation of one's life and guaranteeing our liberty. These
are not second-class concerns. Yet preservation of human life is
also the government's chief regulatory interest in arms. Constitutional review of gun laws thus finds both individual and governmental interests at their zenith.
If a gun law is to be upheld, it should be upheld precisely because the government has a compelling interest in its regulatory
impact. Because the governmental interest is so strong in this
arena, applying the ordinary level of strict scrutiny for enumerated rights to gun regulations will not result in wholesale abandonment of the country's basic firearm safety laws. Strict scrutiny
is context-sensitive and is "far from the inevitably deadly test
imagined by the Gunther myth." Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory
and Strict in Fact:An EmpiricalAnalysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VANDERBILT L. REV. 793, 795 (2006). The prohibition on possession of guns by felons, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and
the requirement that gun buyers undergo a background check for
history of criminal activity or mental illness, 18 U.S.C. § 922(t),
would easily survive strict scrutiny.
Searching for a lower level of review, the Solicitor General
would look to "the practical impact of the challenged restriction,"
U.S. Br. 8, 24, as courts do at the outset of examining the constitutionality of election regulations. But voting is a poor analog to gun
possession. Each exercise of the right to vote burdens state resources and implicates a direct interest in operating an election,
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which states have an express grant of authority to regulate. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
And not all election laws are subject to the government's endorsed level of scrutiny. If the Court finds the burden to be "severe," then strict scrutiny is applied. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area
New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
428, 434 (1992). The Solicitor General assumes that no gun regulations-including those at issue here- can impose "severe" burdens on Second Amendment rights. But no such presumption exists in the election field. Considering the severity of the challenged
gun laws, the correct standard, per the Solicitor General's precedent, would be strict scrutiny.
[The Solicitor General's brief was pernicious. I would
have preferred the Court adopt the city's view, defining
the Second Amendment right as one that can only be exercised for a governmental purpose, than have a fraudulent
conception of an individual right that exists in theory but
which in practice is erased by complete deference to legislative will.
Notably, the Solicitor General's approach was unique
among our opponents-a fact I attribute to its weakness.
The election law cases cited by the Solicitor General on
behalf of his theory did not support it. We were also grateful for the excellent amicus brief filed by Sidley & Austin
on behalf of the Goldwater Institute, which demolished the
Solicitor General's position in a manner that we had neither the space nor time to do.
The Solicitor General's deft ability to be on both sides of
the issue-paying the individual right a good amount of lip
service while working assiduously to ensure that no operative Second Amendment right would come out of the casemay have impressed some observers. But such cynical spin
failed to garner a single vote on the Supreme Court.]
The government's fears of a meaningful Second Amendment
standard are unfounded. Seven years ago, the Fifth Circuit announced a version of strict scrutiny to evaluate gun laws under
the Second Amendment, permitting regulations that are 'limited,
narrowly tailored specific exceptions or restrictions for particular
cases that are reasonable and not inconsistent with the right of
Americans generally to individually keep and bear their private
arms as historically understood in this country." Emerson, 270
F.3d at 261; United States v. Patterson,431 F.3d 832, 836 (5th Cir.
2005) (applying Emerson, restrictions are "limited" and "narrowly
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tailored" but "[p]rohibiting unlawful drug users from possessing
firearms is not inconsistent with the right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment"). Large cities in the Fifth Circuit
remain generally more peaceful than Washington, D.C.
The careless handling of social science by Petitioners and their
amici underscores the impropriety of adopting anything but the
highest level of scrutiny for regulations implicating Second
Amendment rights. The matter is only peripheral to the case, but

some remarks are in order.
The ABA asserts that "the most notable risk factor for mortality
among abused women is the presence of a gun," and argues that
"[h]ow to weigh these risks against the desire to own a gun for self
defense is a policy judgment, not a constitutional one." ABA Br. 21
n.8 (citing Jane Koziol-McLain, et al., Risk Factors for FemicideSuicide in Abusive Relationships: Results From a Multisite Case
Control Study, in ASSESSING DANGEROUSNESS: VIOLENCE BY
BATTERERS AND CHILD ABUSERS 143 (J.C. Campbell ed., 2d ed.
2007)) (other citation omitted). Putting aside the likelihood that
the Constitution embodies at least some policy choices the ABA
finds uncongenial, the cited study does not support the conclusion.
The study reports an adjusted odds ratio of 13.0 for "abuser gun
access," not victim gun access. The study does not address, much
less refute, "the desire to own a gun for self defense. ' 23
Petitioners also persist in relying upon a deeply flawed study
claiming their handgun ban reduced deaths. Colin Loftin, et al.,
Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns on Homicide and Suicide in the District of Columbia, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 23

Putting aside that correlation does not equal causation,
even the correlative relationship is dubious. The study measures
death with raw numbers rather than rates, thus ignoring the
city's dramatic depopulation through the studied period. Between
the two ten-year periods examined in the study, Washington's average annual population declined 15%. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES. When
one examines homicide rates, the supposed benefits disappear.
The suicide prevention benefits are likewise overstated. Moreover,
the study ends in 1988, a year in which the murder rate doubled
(1991).24

23. A different study indicates that women living alone with a gun face a statistically
insignificant odds ratio for increased femicide of 0.22. Jacquelyn Campbell, et al., Risk
Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1090-92
(2003).
24. The study constituted the builk of Petitioners' evidence on summary judgment.
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pre-ban levels, and one year before a severe crime increase. In
1991, the peak year, the homicide rate tripled pre-ban levels. FBI
UCR Data compiled by Rothstein Catalog on Disaster Recovery
at
available
Center,
Disaster
The
and
http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/dccrime.htm.
Gun crimes, suicides, and accidents were not unknown in early
America. E.g., Cramer & Olson, Pistols, supra. The same newspaper containing admonishments from Continental Congress representatives that "It is the Right of every English Subject to be prepared with Weapons for his Defense," N.C. GAZETTE (NEWBURN),
July 7, 1775, at 2, col. 3, also reported that "a Demoniac" shot
three and wounded one with a sword before being shot by others.
Id. at 3, col. 1.
Petitioners' sophistic "reasonableness" arguments were likewise
familiar to the Framers-and rejected. Colonial Americans were
conversant with the works of Cesare Beccaria, whose 1764 treatise
ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS founded the science of criminology.
John Adams cited Beccaria to open his argument at the Boston
Massacre trial. 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 242. In a passage
Jefferson copied into his "Commonplace Book" of wise excerpts
from philosophers and poets, Beccaria decried the "False Utility"
of laws that
disarm those only who are neither inclined nor determined to
commit crimes. Can it be supposed that those who have the
courage to violate the most sacred laws of humanity, the most
important of the code ... will respect the less important and
arbitrary ones, which can be violated with ease and impunity,
and which, if strictly obeyed, would put an end to personal
Such laws make things worse for the assaulted
liberty ....
[These] laws [are] not preand better for the assailants ....
ventive but fearful of crimes, produced by the tumultuous impression of a few isolated facts, and not by thoughtful consideration of the inconveniences and advantages of a universal
decree....
Thomas Jefferson, COMMONPLACE BOOK 314 (1926).
"If it be thought that the privilege is outmoded in the conditions
of this modern age, then the thing to do is to take it out of the
Constitution, not to whittle it down by the subtle encroachments
of judicial opinion." Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427-28
(1956) (citation omitted).
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Petitioners plainly disagree with the Framers' Second Amendment policy choices. Petitioners' remedy must be found within the
Constitution's Fifth Article, not with linguistic sophistries or an
anemic standard of review that would deprive the right of any real
force.
V.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL MUST
OBEY THE CONSTITUTION.

The Constitution, and its Bill of Rights-including the Second
Amendment-are the supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 1. "That the Constitution is in effect ... in the District has
been so often determined in the affirmative that it is no longer an
open question." O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 541
(1933).
Petitioners' legislative authority is not above the Constitution,
but derived from it; a delegation of Congress's authority to legislate for the District. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. That power "is
plenary; but it does not ... authorize a denial to the inhabitants of
any
constitutional
guaranty
not
plainly
inapplicable."
O'Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 539. "If, before the District was set off,
Congress had passed an unconstitutional act, affecting its inhabitants, it would have been void. If done after the District was created, it would have been equally void." Id. at 541 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, Congress can exercise general police powers within
the District, "so long as it does not contravene any provision of the
Constitution of the United States." Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389, 397 (1973) (citation omitted). For example, Congress
may operate public schools in the District of Columbia, a power
otherwise reserved to the states. But such schools cannot be segregated. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Indeed, because the Constitution with its Bill of Rights applies
directly to the federal government, of which the city is a creature,
Petitioners are bound to respect even those rights that are not incorporated as against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (Seventh
Amendment right to civil jury trial); United States v. Moreland,
258 U.S. 433 (1922) (Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indict-
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ment).25 Even were the pre-incorporation holding of Presserv. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) still good law, which is doubtful, 26 the
fact remains that the District of Columbia is not a state. Hepburn
v. Elizey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805). The question of incorporation is therefore not before the Court.
Nothing in Petitioners' precedent suggests that the District is
free to ignore constitutional restrictions. The judges of the District's local court system do not merit Article III protection because they are Article I judges. D.C. Code § 11-101; Palmore, 411
U.S. at 398. When the District's judges were Article III judges,
they enjoyed Article III protection. O'Donoghue, supra (Congress
could not reduce pay of District of Columbia judges). And preSixteenth Amendment tax limitations did not apply within the
District of Columbia because Article I's District Clause grants
Congress the broad power of "exclusive Legislation" for the city,
including the power to tax "in like manner as the legislature of a
State may tax the people of a State for State purposes." Gibbons v.
District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404, 407 (1886).
Washington was not planned as a "Forbidden City" in which
federal officials would be shielded from the hazards of interaction
with the otherwise-free people of the United States. Quite the contrary:
It is important to bear constantly in mind that the District
was made up of portions of two of the original states of the
Union, and was not taken out of the Union by the cession.
Prior thereto its inhabitants were entitled to all the rights,
guaranties, and immunities of the Constitution.... [I]t is not
reasonable to assume that the cession stripped them of these
rights....
O'Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 540.
Finally, there is no logic to Petitioners' extraordinary claim that
gun control "is the most important power of self-protection" for the
seat of government. Pet. Br. 38. The District Clause, after all, allows Congress to "[erect] Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards
and other needful Buildings." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Con25. Petitioners distinguish the Second Amendment as relating only to federal authority
over the states, rather than securing individual rights; but that argument assumes their
conclusion. Pet. Br. 38.
26. As Judge Reinhardt recognizes, "Presser rest[s] on a principle that is now thoroughly discredited," Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1067 n.17 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Emerson, 270 F.3d at 221 n.13).
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gress surely has the power to regulate firearms in Washington;
but if Congress felt that disarming Americans at home were necessary for its security, it might have attempted to do so in the first
177 years of the city's service as the seat of government. As recent
history demonstrates, those who would attack our capital are
hardly deterred by Petitioners' ban on handguns and functional
firearms in the home.
CONCLUSION
The decision below is correct with respect to the merits of Respondent's substantive claims, and should be affirmed in that regard.
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